DISTINCTION BETWEEN SERVANTS AND AGENTS.

A person's jural relations may be varied by his own acts
or through the agency of another acting for him. His representative is sometimes called an "agent" and sometimes a "servant".
in either case the liability of the constituent for acts done in his
behalf is well established, and the crucial question is usually
whether the representative has acted within his "authority" or
"employment" as the case may be.
While agency in its broad sense includes the relation of
master and servant as well as that of principal and agent, these
relations are discussed separately by theoretical writers, and the
rules relating to the liability of the constituent to third persons
in each situation have been worked out in .nnindependent line of
cases. The scope of a servant's employment is tested by more
or less crystallized rules very different from those employed
when the inquiry is whether the agent acted within his
authority.1 The distinction so uniformly assumed between these
relations has been misunderstood in two ways: first, as to which
element of the relationship indicates its character, and second,
as to the line of distinction.
The elements of either relationship are a constituent, a representative, and the act or acts to be done. Assuming the persons involved to be normal, the only real distinction between
agency relationships must arise out of the character of the thing
to be done by the representative. The usual treatment which
shifts the emphasis away from the acts to be performed to the
persons involved, is circuitous, and, moreover, is confusing in
cases where one representative is to perform different kinds of
'While parties dealing with an agent are bound at their peril to notice
the limitations to his authority and cannot hold the principal unless the
agent was within that authority, yet a servant may be deemed within the
scope of his employment and his master held even though the act he
committed be done in willful disobedience. Mechem on Agency, 2nd Ed.,
Pars. 7o7, 1874, et seq. Phila. & Reading Ry. Co. v. Derby, 14 How. 468.
"In tort, masters are held answerable for conduct on the part of their
servants, which they not 'only have 'not authorized, but have forbidden."
"A man is not bound by his servants' contracts unless they are made in
his behalf and by his authority." Justice Holmes, 4 Harvard Law Review
348, c Harvard Law Review i,
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acts. Some acts, owing to their nature, will bind the constituent
only in case he authorizes the representative who performs
them; while other acts subject the constituent to their legal consequences, if they were within the scope of the representative's
employment. No classification and naming of representatives is
necessary to determine the constituent's liability. - Convenience
no doubt justifies the practice of calling representatives agents
or servants, according tq the kind of acts they are to perform;
and these names are likely to continue. But this practice gives
a false guide so far as it gives the impression that once a representative has been branded agent or 'servant, his character is
fixed for every kind of act. It is helpful to recall that the simple
and direct proposition underlying is this: the character of the
act for which it is sought to hold a constituent responsible, is
the criterion as to wheiher we should test for "authority" or for
"employment".
A more difficialt problem is to trace the line of distinction
between acts and to indicate what acts must be authorized in
order to bind the constituent and what acts render him liable
if only they are within the scope of the representative's employment. The ability to effect certain jural charges generally
called authority, is with more propriety called legal power.!
This term better indicates such ability as a conception apart
from the authorization or facts which give rise to it. There
seems to be no analogous term to indicate the ability of a servant
to impose obligation on his master. A conception, however, of
such ability, apart from the facts which give rise to -it, is
helpful.
Since legal power is an institution broader than agency
and since the ability of a servant to impose obligations on his
master is but a branch of the master's broader liability, it may
be helpful to recall a few fundamental ideas with reference to
jural changes in general. Some recent discussions 3 have well
Yale Law Journal 46.
'Professor Hohfeld in 23 Yale Law Journal 2-6, 44; Professor Pound, in
'23

26 International Journal of Ethics, 92, 95.

138

UNIV.RSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

indicated the character of legal power and incidentally have
indicated the cases where such power is appropriate and essential
to effective action.
It has come to be recognized that the paramount object of
law is to protect the interests of individuals and society. 4 These
interests the law recognizes and protects by throwing about them
the legal institutions known as rights, powers, privileges, and
immunities.5 The extent to which an individhal's interests are
recognized, and the fortifying rights, powers, privileges, and
immunities which he possesses are continually being shifted and
altered. These changes are made in one of two ways: either the
consent of the parties to the change is recognized as effective to
accomplish the change* or the sovereignty regardless of the
parties' consent imposes the change. 6 By the former method
contractual duties are incurred, property is transferred, and
privileges and powers are granted. By the latter method the
obligations to make reparation for torts are imposed, property
is ccidenmned for public benefit, and other changes accomplished.
Most of the state-made changes are imposed as the jural consequences of acts committed. It should be noted that while the
state may either enlarge or diminish the rights of an individual,
the consent of that individual can alter his rights 7 only by way
of diminishing them. To enlarge his rights requires either state
action or the consent of some other individual. Of course the
consent of an individual to the curtailment of some right may be
the inducement which indirectly procures for him a new and
enlarged right. He may, for example, acquire property or personal interests because he consents to pay for them, but the
only direct effect of his consent is to surrender right and become obliged to pay.
'Beae, The Conflict of Laws, p. $5i.
'See Professor Pound. 26 International Journal of Ethics 92. Professor Hohfeld, 23 Yale Law Journal t6.
The word "rights" is sometimes used in a broad sense to include this
entire group of legal institutions.
'II Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History 54
'The word "rights" is frequently used herein in the broad sense indi-"
cated in note 5.
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Rights, powers, privileges, and immunities, and the shift__
ing thereof, imply the existence of legal persons, having more or
less capacity. While capacity as an attribute of legal personalityhas in one aspect to do with ability to acquire and hold eights,__
we are more concerned at present with the ability to part with
rights and incur duties. The law imposes duties and takes away
rights, usually, because of some act or acts committed. In
doing this the law needs to recognize not only a legal persoa
with ability to owe but also needs to recognize in the actor
ability to bind that legal person. In the simplest case, of course,
the person bound and the actor are identical but this, as will
appear later, is not always the case. As noted above, the diminution of rights or increase of duties may come about either as.
the result of an act indicating consent or by will of the state
exerted regardless of the individual's consent. To effect a consensual change requires capacity different in degree, if not in
kind, from a capacity sufficient to subject one to state-imposed
changes.
The diminution of one's rights by consent, requires a high
degree of capacity called "power" Legal power has been variously defined. According to Professor Pound the word power
is used to indicate the "capacity of creating, divesting, or altering
rights"." According to Professor Hohfeld a person whose political control is paramount in effecting change in a given legal
relation is said to have legal power.9 According to Hon. John
W. Salmond a power may be defined as "ability conferred upon
a person by the law to determine, by his own will directed to
that end, the rights, duties, liabilities, or other legal relations
either of hinself or of other persons". 10 While the idea does
not very clearly appear in some definitions of legal power, it
should be observed that the acts which a power refider effective
are those which manifest consent to a change in jural relations,
such acts being apparently directed to that end. They are what
International Journal -of-Ethics, p. 9-.
Yale Law Journal, 16.
"Salmond on Jurisprudence, par. 76.
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Professor Holland would call "juristic acts". 11 The making
of contracts, the alienation of property, and the granting of
privileges, and all consensual changes are brought aboiut by acts
apparently intended to have those results.1 2 Contrasted with
these are acts such as striking another or trespassing upon his
property, which acts produce a change of jural relations regardless of the doer's consent or intention as to the jural effects of
the acts. The jural result in such cases is generally imposed by
way of redressing an injury done to some social or individual
interest. The state itself .makes the change in jural relation.
No legal power is needed. Power should not be used to explain
the origin of duties which the state imposes directly, regardless
of the individual's consent.
Since consent is an "internal act" which the law cannot take
cognizance of directly, it is generally conceived that the law acts
on the manifestation, that is, on the external act indicative of
consent. The essence of legal power then is the ability to curtail or divest rights of a person subject to the power by manifestation of consent to the change.
Acts, other than those above called juristic, are generally
not expected to have any legal effect; at any rate they are not
intended to work directly any detrimental change in jural relations. Occasionally, however, they do work .that result. Any
legal person is subject to duties. These duties-may be violated
by acts. When a violative act occurs the law imposes a penalty,
generally in the form of a sanctioning duty: Such change follows the act without regard to the consent of the actor. This
process differs in two particulars from the exercise of. legal
power. The character of the act differs in that it is not directed
to the result; and the character of the change differs in that it is
' Holland on Jurisprudence, 8th Ed., p., 1o2.
"Contracts for an undisclosed principal may seem to be an exception, but the doctrine which permits an undisclosed principal to sue and
be used on contracts is an anomaly. Dean James B. Ames in 18 Yale Law
Journal 443.
"The plain truth ought never to be forgotten that the whole law as
to the rights and liabilities of an undisclosed principal is inconsistent, with
the elementary doctrines of the law of contracts." 3 Law Quarterly Rer
view, p. 359.
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usually a sanctioning or secondary duty that is produted. Owing
to these differences such changes may be wrought by one who
has not legal power. The state will impose its sanctions, for acts
committed, so long as the -actor_ has even a small degree of
capacity. The act of the infant or insane person will call down
the sanction just as surely as the act of ar adult. While ability
to bring about the above jural changes differs from legal
power it is still a phase of capacity. This- smaller degree of
capacity in an actor, which will satisfy the law as a prerequisite
to visiting the usual consequences of non-juristic acts, does not
seem to have a name, but a conception of it, as distinguished
from legal power, seems important.
It is impossible for an act to have a double aspect. First,
it may be viewed as an act to which the law attaches conse-quences irrespective of the parties' consent! and,. sec6nd, it may
be viewed as an act manifesting consent and so-dependent for its
efficacy on the existence of power. Such an act is the infant's
fraudulent pretense of binding himself. to a contract. The infant
has such capacity that the law imposes on him a duty to make
reparation for his fraud. The contract fails for lack of legal
power.
Some jural results have been attributed to powerswhich
must find other explanation if the operation of a power depends •
on the result achieved being that intended or apparently intended.
The ability of a person to "break a contract and substitute a duty
of paying damages for the pre-existing duty of performing"
has been cited as an illustration of a power.13 In such cases
of course the result of the breach is the same whether intended
or not. But, it is submitted, such a case does not involve legal
power. The breach of a contractual duty, indeed the breach of
any duty, does not require legal power. Nor does the substitution of a duty to pay damages require .a legal power.1 4 The
state imposes that duty.1 5
"26 International Journal of Ethics, p. 95.
""An insane person is liable for a breach committed during insanity,
of a contract made while sane." Page on Contracts, par. 897.

"Beale, Conflict of Laws, p. 186.
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The existence of power or the existence of lesser capacity
does not necessarily indicate any jural relation. Capacity, in
any degree, may be but an attribute of legal personality conferred
by law, the person of inherence and the person of incidence being
the same. But it is a common situation that one person has
legal power to bind another or has capacity, by the perforniance
of non-juristic acts, to render another amenable. The person
of inherence and the person of incidence are now related but
are no longer the same. Such a situation constitutes an agency
relation. If the representative has power to bind his constituent
by juristic acts, he is called an agent; if he has only a capacity to
make his constituent amenable for non-juristic acts, he is called
a servant.'
The conception of power as such, apart from the facts
which give rise to it, remains essentially the same whether it be
noted as the power one has to alter his own relations or the
power an agent has to alter the relations of his principal. A
corresponding identity exists in the conception of that capacity
less than power, which we see on one hand enabling a person by
non-juristic acts to alter his own relations and on the other
hand enabling a servanti by non-juristic acts, to alter those of
his master. Unfortunately this latter sort of capacity has no
distinctive name.
The existence of power or lesser capacity is a question of
fact. As noted above the power or capacity to affect one's own
jural situation is conferred by law and usually depends on such
circumstances as age, personal ability, and domestic status. In a
few. cases the law may confer power or capacity to alter the
jural situation of another. The usual method of creating an
agency relation, however, is for the constituent to confer the
power or capacity, as the case may be. The power is conferred and the correlative liability is assumed directly by real
or apparent consent. The sort of juristic acts which the agent
may perform in the constituent's behalf are pointed out. In
"The master is under a liability analogous to that of the principal
and the correlative ability of the servant should be recognized.
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consenting to have such acts performed in his behalf, it is fairly
clear that the constituent contemplates third parties and- consents to subject himself to the result of those acts. Of course
he does not necessarily consent to the particular acts. He may
not even kno~w of them. But the potentiality-the power itselfhe does consent to.
The lesser capacity which a servant has and to which the
master bears a correlative liability, 17 is not consented to, except
indirectly, by the master. The constituent employs a servant to
perform certain, or various, acts; the law then imposes the'
liability. The employment is consented to but the liability is
not. The employer may not even contemplate relationship with
third persons. Neither employment nor scope of employment
is the analogue of delegated power but employment is the premise
upon which the law supplies the analogue of delegated power,
viz., the servant's capacity or ability, by his acts, to provoke the
imposition of obligations on his master. Just as making a contract gives rise to a consensual duty while absolute duties are
imposed; so the delegation of a power gives rise to a consensual
liability 17 while imposed liability 17 exists whenever one is employed to act for another. Consent of the constituent is thus.
at the basis of investure of another person with either power or
lesser capacity but in one case it operates directly and in the
other indirectly.
In view of the multifarious and equivocal dealings of men
it is frequently a vexed question of fact whether the requisite
consent has been given. Such consent as exists is gene-rally evidenced by communications from the constituent to the representative, but it should be observed that the power or other
capacity conferred is a thing quite distinct from any contract for
service that may exist between them.
The criteria as to the existence of. power, on one hand, or
mere capacity on the other, differ in kind because the operative
facts to be established differ; these criteria differ also in degree
'Liability is here used in the sense of Prof. Hohfeld's definition,
Yale Law Journal, p. 44.
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owing to considerations of policy. For instance, the distinction between deviation and departure by a servant, and the
rule that deviation does not take him outside his employment
could have, at most, only a figurative application in dealing with
the establishment of power. Again the cases which have held a
servant to be still within the scope of his employment in spite
of his willful disobedience, cannot with safety be applied in
testing for power. The establishment of capacity or power is
not usually an end in itself but is sought as a means of holding
the alleged constituent. This leads to considerations of policy.
In cases where it is a question whether the act has been committed by' a servant acting within his employment, the right of
a third person usually has already been invaded and a loss sustained by him. On the other hand the existence of a power
usually comes into question when io-right of the third person
has been invaded; the only thing at sake is a benefit he hopes to
derive from a bargain. Owing to these and other considerations,
not only a different sort but also a weaker array of evidential
facts seems sufficient to establish mere capacity than would suffice to establish power.
There is nothing to be gained by comparing the criteria as
to the existence of power and capacity, respectively, any further
than is necessary to indicate that they are different. The point
to be emphasized is that in considering whether one person is
subject to or liable for acts committed by another, the first step
is to determine whether the jural consequences alleged depend on
the representative having power or mere capacity. The next
step is to apply the appropriate tests to determine whether that
power of capacity exists.
In one class of acts, particularly, a failure to note the
above distinction has caused confusion. Courts have frequently
assumed that words alleged to have been spoken in behalf of a
constituent were not chargeable to him unless the representative
had power to make those words bind his constituent to a consensual obligation.1 " Obviously a representation is an act which may
"Grant v. Norway, io C. B. 865; Udell v. Atherton, 7 H. & N.
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violate existing rights of others and be attended by legal consequences regardless of the maker's consent. It would seem to
follow that power as distinguished from capacity is not requisite
20
to such consequences. In the case of fraudulent 19 or libelous
statements the courts have no hesitation in predicating liability
even where the author of the statement is without legal power to
bind by such a statement. , An infant or insane person is bound
to make restitution for damages thus occasioned. A servant
may subject his master to a similar duty. There was for a time
some confusion in the fraud cases. We find Baron Bramwell in
the case of Udell v. Atheron,21 saying: "It certainly would be
a most singular thing that the defendant should be liable for this
fraud of Youngman's though not liable on Youngman's warranty, which he is not, although the same reasoning would apply."
It is-now recognized that a statement which would be inoperative
as a consensual warranty because the maker lacked power 2 2 may.
be operative as. a fraudulent representation. 23 Such a statement
as .a juristic act' has no consequence; but viewed in another
aspect it is such an act that the law imposes a jural result regardless of whether the maker has power.
It is in cases where the statement is of such character as
would work an estoppel that most confusion has arisen. Even
in these cases it may be said that statements appropriate to work
an estoppel are generally given that effect though the author was
without power to bind by such a statement. By the better doctrine, infants may estop themselves. 2 ' Servants may estop.their.
masters by most kinds of representations if made within te.
scope of their employment.25 This is true in cases where te
representative clearly had no power. For example, where the
servant of a municipal corporation in charge of its files'exhibited
B. . C S5A
8 L N. S. 1023.
=7 H. & N. 372.
" Dunham v, Salmon, x.o Wis. 64.
" Haskell v. Starbird, ia Mass. x37.
"Bigelow on Estoppel, 6th Ed., Ix 62&
M
B*gelow on Estoppel, 6th Ed., p. 618.
•
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to a prospective bidder what purported to be a copy of plans and
specifications for work to be done, the corporation was estopped
as against this bidder from denying that the plans and specifications exhibited were the true ones.28 The holding in these cases
seems obviously correct. Estoppel does not create a consensual
situation. It is one imposed as a consequence of words or other
acts. the law creates it, and no legal power on the part of the
actor is essential to its existence. As to one class of statements,
however, the courts have hesitated and often refused to give
them effect as an estoppel of the constituent even where made
by one pretty clearly within his employment. . The statements
referred to are those which indicate the extent of an agent's
power or which relate to facts upon which power is conditioned.
In dealing with this class of representations it has been
supposed that we encounter the proposition that an agent cannot
enlarge his authority by his own representations. The difficulty
has come from a failure to observe what is meant by "his own
representations". Clearly representations made by an agent in
his own behalf should not operate to enlarge his delegated
power, the extent of which is generally measured by the real
or apparent consent of his constituent. But where one is employed by and does make representations in behalf of his constituent these representations may operate to enlarge his power
or to establish facts upon which his power is conditioned. Suppose a bank cashier were authorized to purchase a certain article
when the bank deposits reached $iooooo, and suppose further
that this same cashier were directed to publish financial statements monthly. If he were to publish a monthly statement indicating deposits in excess of $iooooo and a third person relying
on the truth of such statement were to sell the artide to this
cashier acting in behalf of the bank, would anyone doubt the
liability of the bank? Here the statement is one which does not
operate to enlarge the agent's power but does operate to place
beyond dispute facts upon which his power depends. With the
facts thus established, the power as it admittedly exists is suffi" City of Chicago v. Sexton, 2 N. E., 263. 266.
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cient. A case which illustrates that a statement made by an
agent may operate even to enlarge his power is found in Holden
v. Phelps.27 The facts in that case were that a board of directors passed a resolution authorizing the "treasurer" of the company to "discharge and release mortgages". One man held the
position of secretary-treasurer. As secretary he recorded the
resolution and made it read as authorizing him to "discharge,
release, and assign mortgages". He showed the resolution thus
recorded to the- plaintiff, who became assignee for value of a
mortgage which this treasurer assigned to him in the name of the
bank. The purchase money paid by the plaintiff to the treasurer
was misappropriated by the latter. It- was held that the bank
was bound by the assignment. The representation which this
agent made as to the extent of his power, it was within his
employment to make, and so was effective to enlarge the bounds
of his power.
The application of the above principles to cases where a
station agent has issued a bill of lading without receiving-the
goods, would seem obvious; but in such cases the decisions are in
great conflict as to whether one who has innocently advanced
money on the security of such a bill of lading may hold the carrier company. 28 The bill of lading is first of all a written
representation that the goods have been received and one which
by its terms purports to be made in behalf of the company. This
representation is not made to the shipper alone but to all whom
the bill of lading may reach in due course. Representations need
not be made directly. In speaking of the representation of
authority which an agent impliedly makes when he executcs
- "The
a negotiable instrument, it is said in "Polhillv. Walter,"
representation is made to all to whom the bill may be offered in
course of circulation, and is, in fact, intended to be made to all,
and the plaintiff is one of those."
141 Mass. 456.
' Armour v. Michigan Central R. R. Co., 65 N. Y. iii; Grant v. Norway, io C. B. 665; Friedlander v. Railroad Co., 130 U. S. 416. See alsd
article by H. S. Ross in 15 Michigan Law Review, 38, where a large

number of cases involving this point are reviewed.
'
B. & Ad. z4.
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Quite distinct from the question as to what representation
has been made, is the question whether that statement is chargeable to the company. -To be sure. the station agent is empowered
to make a bill of lading contract only on condition that he
receive the goods. He has not even apparent power to make a
bill of lading contract except upon that condition. But he is
employed to state in written bills of lading what goods have been
received, and, by silence or otherwise to negative the receipt of
other goods. This he does in behalf of the company. The
station agent is no doubt instructed to make such a representation only when he has received the goods. The truth of the
situation may be the motive which should, and which is expected,
to induce his statements, but violation of orders or improper
motives do not of themselves remove an act from the scope of
a servant's employment. Moreover, a master may be estopped
to deny the employment of a servant whose statements have misled another. Ordinarily, eriiploym nt and consequent capacity
of a servant can not thus be shown, because the person injured
has not been misled by any apparent relationship between the
about from the person having been misled, such an apparent relation may have contributed to induce the" injurious action.
Therefore, estoppel can and often does operate to establish a
master and servant relation in favor of one who has been injured
by false statements of an apparent servant. One of the clearest
cases against a constituent is that where the constituent has referred third persons to a representative for information, and
the third person has been misled by the false or fraudulent statements of that representative.3 0 The carrying company is such a
constituent. It has put a man in the position of station agent
to whom as is well known third persons turn for statements
issued in behalf of the company as to what goods have been"
received.
For the above reasons the statement of the servant in behalf
of his- company that the goods have been received, would seem
to put the fact of their receipt beyond question in favor of one
Philps v. Mallory Commission Co., io5 Mo. App. 67, 78 S. W. zo97.
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who has advanced money on the bill of lading. With this fact
established, the power of the agent to contract for the carriage
of the goods is complete, and the company would seem to be contractually bound by the bill of lading. Moreover, it would seem
that one in whose favor the fact of the goods having been received is established, should be able to hold the carrier on its
common law liability which exists apart from contract.
While many courts have insisted that sound reason exonerated the carrier in the above type of cases, it has been long
recognized that convenience and policy required that the carrier
should be held. Statutes have been pa.4sed by Congress and.a
large number of state legislatures providing that the carrier is
liable in such cases. 31 It is submitted that the common law
would have supplied a clear and expedient rule had the fundimental principles of agency been kept in mind.
It may be well to add a word by way of summarizing theforegoing discussion. Changes in one's jural relations are
usually the result of acts. Juristic acts, owing to their character and the result to be produced, are operative when performed
by a man in his own behalf, only in case he has legal power.
His other acts, so far as they have legal significance, are not
dependent on legal power. The same distinction exists between
acts to be performed by a representative. Juristic acts require
power; other acts do not. A representative whose function
requires power may well be called an agent and a representative
whose function requires no power may well be called a servant.
It frequently happens that one representative has both functions
to perform and if so the particular act in question indicates
whether power or a lesser capacity is required. The existence of
either power or a lesser capacity is a question of fact but the
criteria as to its existence differ in the two cases. By way of
illustrating the necessity for observing this distinction the cases
are referred to where it is endeavored to hold a carrying company on a bill of lading issued by its station agent who did so
ML39 U. S. Stat., p. 542. The Uniform Bills of Lading Act which.
contains such a provision has been adopted in ig States. 2 American Bar
Association Journal 710, 3 American Bar Association Journal 524.
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without receiving the goods. If the representation in such bill
of lading, that the goods have been received, is chargeable to the
company, it should by well known*principles be estopped to deny
the truth of the statement. . Many courts have assumed that
power on the part of the station agent to make such statements
binding as consensual obligations, is a prerequisite to holding the
company; and failing to find that power have exonerated the
carrier. Obviously the company has not consented to give their
agent power to bind them under such circumstances. But the
statement need not be viewed as a manifestation of consent and
in its other aspect it is chargeable to the company. It is made in
their behalf by a man whom they have employed to make just
such statements, necessarily leaving to his discretion when and
what specific statements to make. The company's liability 32
correlative to their station agent's capacity follows regardless of
their consent to it.
M. L. Ferson.
Law School, George Washington University.
"See -note x', supra.

